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Abstract 
The role o~ mathematical modeling in science is explored with emphasis on 
its creative aspect- the modeler's art. A paradigm is described which emphasizes 
the cyclic nature o~ the process and whose components are abstraction, prediction, 
interpretation, testing and revision. Abstraction and interpretation allow move-
ment between the real-world and the symbolic, prediction occurs in the mathematical 
realm and is governed by its laws, testing occurs in the real-world and provides 
the basis for revision. 
The abstraction step requires inductive insight and some recent techniques 
~or its teaching are described. The prediction step is deductive and the choices 
between stochastic and deterministic, between analytic and simulative, and between 
discrete and continuous formulations are discussed. Finally, an analysis o~ the 
weight o~ model predictions is given. 
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l. Introduction 
Models are, for the most part, caricatures of reality, but if they 
are good, then, like good caricatures, they portray, though perhaps in 
distorted manner, some of the features of the real world. 
Thus Mark Kac [1969] elegantly summarizes the role of mathematical models in 
science. It is my purpose here, to explore that role, but since such exploration 
must follow a personal course, shaped by the author's experience, I shall no doubt 
leave important issues untouched. For example, I shall avoid a discussion of the 
role of formal axiom systems in mathematical modeling. Such a discussion would be 
too technical for our purposes and is well treated elsewhere, e.g., Maki and 
Thompson [1973] or more thoroughly in Wilder [1965]. On the other hand I shall 
emphasize the creative aspect of the modeler's art. Much of what I say here will 
have been said before, but it is nevertheless appropriate to recall it on this 
opening day to establish a frame of mind for the remainder of the workshop. My 
experience in presenting some of these ideas to an introductory modeling course, 
however, prompts the caveat that it might be even more appropriate to have saved 
this discussion for the closing day! 
1.1. Some Definitions 
To give any definition of a model is to invite exception, but a reasonable 
attempt is represented by Friedenberg's [1968] universal definition of a model 
as a "simplified representation of a real physical system". We shall here limit 
our discussion of models to mathematical models, for after all, the double helix 
of molecular genetics is too a model as are wind tunnel prototypes. 
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Bender [1975] somewhat circularly defines a mathematical model as "an abstract, 
simplified, mathematical construct related to a part of reality and created for a 
particular purpose", while Kac [1969] simply takes mathematical models to be "models 
which can be described symbolically and discussed deductively". 
l. 2. The Value of Modeling 
Why build mathematical models rather than study Nature first-hand? Again we 
turn to Kac [1969] who observes that the primary purpose of modeling is to "polarize 
thinking and to pose sharp questions". As a statistician, I would complete the 
statement by observing that the sharp questions are then put to Nature directly 
using carefully designed experiments. 
In mathematical modeling we must be precise. That we are compelled to simplify 
our view of a physical system, to strip away all but the most essential features of 
~ reality in order to be able to formulate a model precisely, can expose the fertile 
ground required for the emergence of deeper insights. 
In formulating a model mathematically, we provide a language with which we 
can manipulate (subject to the laws of mathematics and logic) relationships amongst 
the primitives of our subject matter, to establish, unambiguously, implications of 
the theory on which the model is based, and so to test that theory. The method 
forces us to identify and label assumption, supposition and idealization. Modeling 
can also be used to synthesize and organize existing knowledge, to integrate inde-
pendent findings and thus assess their compatability. 
Finally, modeling provides an economy of thought and a common language for 
scientists in diverse disciplines. Lurking behind every biological model is an 
economic model - a change of nouns effects the conversion. 
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1.3. Two Motivations 
There are many ways in which one can classi:fy mathematical models: simple 
versus complex, descriptive versus conceptual, analytic versus simulative, cause-
effect versus effect-effect, deterministic versus stochastic, and so on. Perhaps 
the most important such classification is according to purpose. While we agree 
with Kac [1969] as to the general intent of modeling, it is nevertheless convenient 
to classify models as either motivated by a desire to understand the real world or 
motivated by a desire to provide a basis for prediction and (perhaps) control. An 
example of the latter motivation is a wish to predict the effect on the dynamics 
of some biological population of a proposed environmental perturbation. This can 
sometimes be done (and is often attempted, e.g., with linear regression models) 
with little biological understanding. 
A similar scheme, described by Lucas [1964] classifies models as rational or 
~ empirical. Rational (or heuristic) models are Gedanken models, derived from theory 
and conjecture about the real system, making careful use of known characteristics 
of the system, and couched in meaningful terms. Empirical models to the contrary 
are exemplified by "curve-fitting" and pay little attention to underlying mecha-
nisms. Of course, most models while ideally rational, have empirical components, 
reflecting lack of theory and the modeling process encourages us to identify these 
gaps. lucas [1964] cautions us to introduce "as much rationality as possible into 
all models used", insofar as such models are likely to also prove better predictors 
than their empirical counterparts when extrapolating outside the data regions on 
which the empirical models are based. 
2. Strategies for Modeling 
The quality of a modeling effort can be measured in several ways, but the 
final test is how able a model is to make correct predictions. Nevertheless, 
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numerous attributes of models can be identified and an appropriate modeling 
strategy should be determined by the specific objectives of the investigation. 
Several authors have proposed criteria for good models and we list a few of 
them. Levins [1966] argues, in the context of population biology, that models 
should be constructed to maximize generality, realism and precision. Noting that 
these are competing objectives, he gives examples in each of which the modeling 
strategy is to sacrifice one ~uality to the other two. 
Generality, also referred to as robustness, allows a model to make predictions 
over broad regions of time or parameter values. Robust models are relatively in-
sensitive to minor changes in assumptions. Indeed, the reality which a model 
attempts to mimic may itself be ~uite sensitive to certain types of perturbation, 
and we should not fault a model of such a system for sharing this property. Thus 
a dynamical model of a commercial fishery might become valueless for prediction 
in the face of a discontinuous change in the environment brought about by a changed 
political condition, for example international fishing regulations. 
The most visible property of a model is the extent to which it is realistic -
to which it does not make simplifying assumptions. E~uivalently, this is a measure 
of the model's complexity, and it is the level of resolution re~uired by the subject 
matter that must determine an appropriate trade-off between tractability and reality. 
As we will observe later, modeling is a cyclic process, commonly beginning with 
simple models and adding complexity (by dropping assumptions) as understanding is 
gained and new ~uestions raised. It is crucial that the modeler be able to move 
easily between the model and the real world, in order to assess sensitivity and 
to revise. 
In many modeling circumstances, it is precision which can be sacrificed since 
often only qualitative predictions are re~uired- Will the proposed perturbation 
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make the population rise or fall? - Then too, the quality of data on which parameter 
estimates are based may not justify an attempt at precise prediction. 
Other characteristics of good models have been given by Morris [1967] who 
lists: 
Relatedness. How many previously known theorems or results does the 
model bring to bear upon the problem? 
Transparency. How obvious is the interpretation of the model? How 
immediate is its intuitive confirmation? 
Fertility. How rich is the variety of deductive consequences which 
the model produces? 
Ease of Enrichment. What difficulties are presented by attempts to 
enrich and elaborate the model in various directions? 
Finally, modeling strategy also includes choice of mathematical tools -
stochastic or deterministic, differential equations versus difference equations, 
etc. But we postpone this discussion for later attention. 
3· A Paradigm 
Although there are numerous variants in the literature, the components of 
the mathematical modeling process are perhaps most clearly depicted by Roberts 
[1976] as follows: 
Mathematical Prediction Mathematical .~ 
model , predictions 
I' 
Trans lation Interp retation 
,, 
Real-world Testing Real-world ~ 
data predictions 
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The figure emphasizes the cyclic nature of the process, and our choice of a start-
ing point for its discussion is arbitrary. 
We shall, in fact, begin with the real-world system to be modeled. By a pro-
cedure which Roberts calls translation and which others call abstraction, the 
modeler represents the real-world symbolically. Some writers here insert a subject 
matter theory - a "real-world model" - between the real-world and the mathematical 
model. This is the inductive step and the one which cannot be taught except per-
haps by apprenticeship. It is an art and at best we might provide conditions under 
which it will flourish. 
The predictive step on the other hand is deductive, and it is here that we 
can bring all the power of existing mathematics to bear to arrive at the logical 
implications of the mathematical model. These implications are then translated 
back to the language of reality by interpretation of the symbols. This provides 
the real-world predictions and is the entry point for the statistician who designs 
real-world experiments with which to test the predictions. The adequacy of the 
model is thus assessed, our understanding of reality is modified, and the cycle 
begins anew. 
We shall, in what follows, look a bit more closely at each step in the process. 
4. Abstraction 
The translation or abstraction step which takes us from the real-world to the 
mathematical model has two components - the inductive insight and the choice of 
mathematical formalism. The inductive aspect is the creative one, the one excep-
tionally difficult to teach, the one even difficult to describe. The choice of 
mathematics, on the other hand, I will soon argue, is largely preco~ditioned. 
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4.l. Induction 
Leon Eisenberg [Maugh, 1974] has observed that the teaching of creativity is 
complicated by the fact that insight is preverbal and thus any verbal description 
of the conditions leading to the birth of an original idea may well be faulty. 
Paul Hal.mos [1968] in a beautiful lecture titled "Mathematics as a Creative Art", 
described as follows the labor pains of insight as experienced by a mathematician: 
The mathematician at work makes vague guesses, visualizes broad 
generalizations, and jumps to unwarranted conclusions. He arranges and 
rearranges his ideas, and he becomes convinced of their truth long before 
he can write down a logical proof. The conviction is not likely to come 
early- it usually comes after many attempts, many failures, many dis-
couragements, many false starts. It often happens that months of work 
result in the proof that the method of attack they were based on cannot 
possibly work, and the process of guessing, visualizing, and conclusion-
jumping begins again. A reformulation is needed - and - and this too 
may surprise you - more experimental work is needed. To be sure, by 
"experimental work" I do not mean test tubes and cyclotrons. I mean 
thought-experiments. When a mathematician wants to prove a theorem 
about an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, he examines its finite-
dimensional analogue, he looks in detail at the 2- and 3-dimensional 
cases, he often tries out a particular numerical case, and he hopes 
that he will gain thereby an insight that pure definition-juggling has 
not yielded. The deductive stage, writing the result down, and writing 
down its rigorous proof are relatively trivial once the real insight 
arrives; it is more like the draftsman's work, not the architect's. 
Induction and creativity have, of course, long been subjects for philosophers 
and psychologists, and we do not pretend to those titles here. However, we have 
seen recent attempts to teach the mathematical modeler's art in college curricula, 
and I should like to describe some of the techniques proposed. 
Frauenthal and Saaty [1976] offer a collection of apparently difficult and 
confusing problems. The problems share the property that a crucial insight 
suggests a mathematization which renders the problem trivial, usually soluble 
without pencil and paper. A sample illustrating the role of symmetry and exempli-
fying analytic versus synthetic thinking follows: 
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The Cup of Coffee and the Cup of Milk. Imagine you are given a 
cup of coffee and a cup of milk, with equal amounts of liquid in the 
two cups. A spoonful of milk is transferred from the milk cup to the 
coffee cup, stirred and then a spoonful of the mixture is returned to 
the milk cup so at the end the amount of liquid in the two cups is 
still the same. Is there more milk in the coffee cup or more coffee 
in the milk cup or what? 
Mbst people say there is more milk in the coffee cup, a few say 
the reverse and still fewer say they are equal. The feeling about 
this problem is that the first transfer of milk to the coffee cup so 
dilutes the spoonful in coffee that the next transfer of the mixture 
cannot take back much of it, hence leaving more milk in the coffee cup 
than coffee in the milk cup. Of course, not being able to take back 
much of it should make it possible to take a lot more coffee in the 
spoonful. But people don't think of it that way. 
Insight: Notice that whatever amount of milk is missing from the 
milk cup is replaced by an equal amount of coffee (and vice-versa) be-
cause at the end each cup has the same amount of liquid with which it 
started. 
Solution: It is therefore obvious that there are equal amounts 
of coffee in the milk and milk in the coffee. 
One can verify this with algebra but with more effort. However 
the algebra assumes homogeneity of the mixture in the coffee cup after 
stirring. This assumption is artificial but unfortunately is needed 
to carry out the algebraic argument that the second spoonful has the 
same ratio of coffee to milk as there is in the entire coffee cup. 
The object of the approach is to 11 ••• illustrate to the student an incisive 
way of thinking which can be carried over into more difficult problems ·•• to im-
prove intuition by alerting the student to principles which operate in a domain 
which is apparently finer than that encountered in daily discourse and in common 
thought. 11 • 
Morris [1967] suggests a procedure for modeling which includes the following 
recommendations: 
a. Factor the problem into simpler ones. 
b. Establish a clear (but perhaps tentative) statement of the deductive 
objectives. The final objective may prove to have been unforeseen. 
c. Seek analogies. This too is an intuitive step, but worth focusing on. 
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d. Consider a specific numerical instance. This may uncover hidden 
assumptions, suggest generalization and at least provide initial 
notation. 
e. Establish symbols. This requires that we clearly identify the 
objects to be mathematized. This often involves idealizations 
that the experienced modeler performs by second nature but should 
be called to the attention of the novice. For example in studying 
spatial pattern, to identify plants as points is an idealization. 
f. Write down the obvious. That is, write in terms of the symbols 
the obvious aspects of the numerical example in hopes of suggesting 
generalization. 
g. If a tractable model is obtained, enrich it. Otherwise, simplify. 
We shall return to this point in our discussion of model revision. 
~ Pollock [1976] has adapted Morris' principles to create, in coursework fashion, 
a modeling studio. He argues that if modeling is an art, then the principles for 
teaching the traditional arts of music, painting and sculpture should apply. Al-
though I will not detail those principles here, an example is the encouragement 
of excess. This might be achieved by extremes of color or size in the visual 
arts - to test the limits of the artist and the medium. The implication for 
mathematical modeling is that such daring invites fresh perspectives and innova-
tive approaches. Another important ingredient of Pollock's modeling studio is 
criticism by other modelers and by oneself. 
4.2. Choice of Tools for Deduction 
The second part of the abstraction step of the modeling paradigm is the choice 
of a mathematical formulation - the choice of tools for the deductive step. An 
appropriate choice is of course not unique, and in fact is largely conditioned by 
- 10 -
the modeler's mathematical training. I saw an excellent illustration of this when 
Pollock, in lecturing to a diverse collection of faculty and students from applied 
mathematics, statistics and operations research, proposed a phenomenon to be 
modeled and invited the audience's insights. The mathematicians saw the situation 
as a natural for description by a system of differential equations, while the 
statisticians envisioned a birth and death stochastic process and to the operations 
researchers, it was obvious that the appropriate tools were those of queuing theory. 
4-3· Stochastic versus Deterministic Models 
As promised at the outset, this discussion is following a personal course, 
and so I should like now to briefly consider the subject of stochastic versus 
deterministic model formulations. Variability in the biological world is well-
known to all of us. Maynard Smith [1974] in the context of mathematical ecology 
claims that deterministic models fail to mirror reality in assuming infinite popu-
lation sizes and in ignoring random fluctuations in the environment. May [1974] 
expands, observing that "birth rates, carrying capacities, competition coefficients, 
and other parameters which characterize natural biological systems all, to a greater 
or lesser degree, exhibit random fluctuations." Ehrlich and Birch [1967] boldly 
assert "models must be stochastic not deterministic." 
If stochastic models are admittedly more realistic, what then the justification 
for deterministic. approaches? A primary one is tractability. By itself, of course, 
mathematical convenience has no place in model building, but deterministic models 
have often proven adequate for mimicing biological systems and providing biological 
insights. Deterministic models are often taken as first approximations to sto-
chastic models, and study of deterministic models can also provide answers to 
questions about the behavior of stochastic ones. For example, May [1971a,b] des-
~ cribes an m-species population model with random environment showing that the 
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conditions for the existence of an equilibrium probability distribution are 
identical to those for a stable equilibrium in the deterministic case. He 
furthermore concludes that if complex natural ecosystems are stable then the 
interactions in them are essentially non-random. 
In a recent series of publications (e.g. Oster [1974]) simple deterministic 
models have been presented which exhibit behavior described as chaotic. That is, 
behavior in which the time path of the system could be taken for a sample path of 
a stochastic process. The implications of the ability to mimic stochastic fluctu-
ations with deterministic models are not yet well studied. 
Voltaire has said "Chance is a word void of sense; nothing can exist without 
a cause. 11 Charles Dickens would disagree: "Accidents will occur in the best 
regulated families. 11 It is beyond our scope to address seriously the fundamental 
but irresolvable issue of determinism versus indeterminism inasmuch as it is an 
issue which we hold is largely irrelevant to applications. That is, even in a 
deterministic universe, in which (I quote Bartlett [1960] after Schrodinger [1944]) 
II a multiplicity of detailed causes is operating to produce the observed broad 
class of events, it is often an economy of thought in the sense of Mach to ignore 
these and appeal merely to the operations of chance and the laws of averages. " 
Thus, for example, in coin tossing or gamete pairing, even if we could argue that 
sufficient knowledge of the physical forces surrounding the event would completely 
determine the outcome, nevertheless from our level of resolution, we perceive the 
process as random. 
In his treatment of the role of stochastic elements in biological models, 
Lucas [1964] expands on and formalizes these notions by proposing that the universe, 
which clearly possesses deterministic features, might also possess truly random 
ones, and if so, these would be characterized by inherent unexplainability and 
- l2 -
thus be outside the realm of science. However, because of our current state of 
ignorance, or because of our failure to take certain knowledge into account, some 
of the deterministic features appear to us as random. To these, Lucas ascribes 
the name pseudo-random and defines the role of science as that of diminishing the 
amount of pseudo-randomness in the world, while true randomness, if it indeed 
exists, sets the bounds on explainability and predictability. 
4.4. Simulation Models 
When the mathematical problems associated with a model are too difficult to 
handle or there is a lack of fundamental theory, the modeler may turn to simu-
lation. The role of the "pilot plant" for simulation in pbysical model building 
is played by the computer in mathematical model building. We shall not pursue 
the subject at length here, but would observe that simulation models tend to share 
the weaknesses of all empirical models. In ecosystem simulation models for example, 
there are often huge numbers of parameters, and many different sets of their values, 
though theoretically contradictory, may adequately simulate observed systems. 
Advantages of simulation modeling are that they allow us to deal with much 
more complex systems than we could by analytic means, and that they can usually 
be designed to allow easy variation of parameter values, thus enabling assessment 
of sensitivity of the modeled system to its parameters. 
4.5. Discrete or Continuous? 
As a final note on the choice of mathematical tools I would call attention 
to the choice between discrete and continuous formulations for a model. The dis-
tinction arises in many settings. In studying spatial pattern in plant communities 
for example, we decide between number of stems and percent cover. In stochastic 
~ process models we choose between discrete and continuous states as well as between 
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discrete and continuous time. In deterministic models, the choice of discrete 
or continuous time becomes one of difference equations or differential equations. 
Difference equations are usually viewed as convenient tools for approximating 
solutions to differential equations, which are of the primary interest. However, 
for many biological situations, it is the discrete formulation which is in fact 
the more realistic, the differential equations model being the approximation. A 
difficulty which arises when using differential equations representations of dis-
crete phenomena is that a given differential equation corresponds to many difference 
equations, all with the same limiting differential equation, but themselves perhaps 
having widely different solutions. Some examples of the implications of this fact 
are given in the expository works of Van der Vaart [1973] and of Frauenthal [1976]. 
5· Mathematical and Real-World Predictions 
We now apply our mathematical tools to the mathematical model to make mathe-
matical predictions. The innovative part here is deciding on the subject matter 
questions to ask in the mathematical language. These predictions are then trans-
lated into the subject discipline to produce real-world predictions. Note that 
we do not here claim to real-world explanation - on~y prediction. As we shall 
emphasize later, different models may make identical predictions but provide 
different explanations. As Bender [ 1975] says, "The mechanism is irrelevant when 
dealing with predictions, but the nature of the mechanism is the heart of an ex-
planation." 
6. Model Testing 
The final step in the modeling cycle is to compare model prediction with 
reality. This typically requires experimental design and statistical inference, 
which topics we shall not pursue here. We only note in this regard that a decision 
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must be reached as to how consistent with reality the model need be. This, of 
course, is determined by the reason for which the modeling effort was mounted. 
It should be emphasized that statistics is no substitute for the experienced 
scientist's intuition and wisdom of subject. 
The question of whether a model is "right" lies outside of mathematics, and 
in some sense no model can be right. A prediction is correct only insofar as its 
mathematical counterpart is logically deduced from the axioms of the model. A 
conclusion derived from a model with gross assumptions is weak. A conclusion de-
rived from a general model and insensitive to its assumptions or one corroborated 
by several models is robust. 
There are numerous illustrations of the fact that several sets of underlying 
assumptions about a real phenomenon can lead to the same mathematical model, and 
thus the same predictions. It follows that even if a model is consistent with 
observation, it cannot be concluded that the assumed mechanisms on which the model 
is based are realistic. 
One of my favorite such illustrations provides several sets of assumptions 
mutually contradictory - for the spatial distribution of cabbage butterfly eggs 
on individual cabbage plants. One model proposes that adult female butterflies 
visit individual plants "at random", laying clusters of eggs. The environment is 
homogeneous in that all plants are equally attractive to the females. It is also 
supposed that the number of eggs in a cluster follows the same probability distri-
bution for each cluster, and that the number of eggs in a given cluster is neither 
dependent on the number in any other nor on the number of clusters. 
Contrary to the assumptions in the first model, a second supposes that eggs 
are not laid in clusters, but are spatially distributed at random on the cabbage 
plants. Furthermore, unlike in the first model, individual heads are not equally 
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attractive to the female butterflies, differing in size, condition and location 
(e.g., border versus interior of the plot or orientation with respect to the sun) 
and so the mean number of eggs varies from head to head. 
Connecting the biological assumptions to mathematical ones leads us to con-
clude for both models that the number of eggs per plant should follow a negative 
binomial distribution, a prediction well confirmed by experiment (Harcourt [1961] 
and Kobayashi [1965]). Thus additional information would be required to decide 
between the two proposed mechanisms (neither of which need, of course, be correct). 
We emphasize that the biological assumptions on which the two models are based are 
not only different but are in fact contradictory. In the absence of additional 
information we might, nevertheless, make predictions about, say, the mean number 
of eggs per plant and thus about future butterfly population sizes. Such predic-
tions could have implications for control decisions with important economic conse-
~ quences even with the mechanism not fully understood. 
For the curious, we remark that for this particular population, experiments 
have been performed in a net house to observe the detailed behavior of the female 
cabbage butterfly (Kobayashi [1966]). Peripheral plants and those nearer the 
light source were favored, but under uniform light conditions, the butterflies 
visited interior plants at random (Poisson). The independence assumption made in 
the first model was also tested and found tenable. Thus the first model proved 
the more appropriate description of the biological mechanism. A third set of 
assumptions about the cabbage butterfly system also leading to the negative bi-
nomial distribution, together with the mathematical details for all three models, 
may be found in Solomon [1976]. An additional collection of three temporal (as 
opposed to spatial) negative binomial models also appears there. 
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7. Model Revision 
We have now come full circle and the path of science directs us to revise 
hypothesis, mdify the model and begin anew. We recall that the last step in 
Morris' [l967] modeling scheme enjoins us to enrich a tractable model, simplify 
an intractable one. He lists as means of simplification: "making variables into 
constants; eliminating variables; using linear relations; adding stronger assump-
tions and restrictions; suppressing randomness". To enrich we perform the opposite 
modifications. 
We close with the injunction that we must all be alert for new tools for the 
modeling studio and wary of stagnation in our modeling. New mathematics (the 
finite element method) or new ways to use existing mathematics (catastrophe theory) 
should continuously enrich our repertoire. (See Williams [l977J for a somewhat 
unorthodox expansion of these comments.) 
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